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I. Business and Legal Truth
Rules of evidence are so thoroughly instilled into the ordinary lawyer
that they are a part of his conscious and subconscious makeup,' He generally looks upon them not only as a principle for the trial of jury cases,
but as an accurate method for any approximate determination of fact.
When applied in some fields of endeavor these rules appear ludicrousimagine a rift in the marital relation because of the constant wrongful use
of opinion evidence by the lawyer's wife. (It has happened!) The business
man, accustomed to his own peculiar method of fact determination, thinks
the lawyer's method unsound, even as applied to jury cases. They speak
different languages. Is an interpreter needed, or should each try to comprehend the other's method of reasoning?
Imagine, if you will, a plaintiff suing a defendant for the contract price
of a large shipment of bamboo skewers. The defense to the action is that
the goods are not merchantable. Days are spent in trial. The plaintiff's
experts swear by all that is holy that the skewers are of unusual excellence, point out their scientific value and their absolute salability; the defendant's experts by the same tokens swear that the skewers are poor,
scientifically unsound, and can be sold in no event. The defendant had
produced two or three housewives to testify, but every question they were
asked was excluded. The jury ponders, listens to impassioned argument by
counsel and to a formal charge by the learned trial judge regarding burden of proof. They deliberate, and everyone of them is certain he knows
no more about the merchantability of the particularskewers than if no evidence had ever been taken. "There is no difficulty, the defendant has not
proven that the skewers were not merchantable, return a verdict for the
plaintiff" a mythical lawyer or a bailiff not quite mindful of his legal duties tells them. But our supposed jury is over-inquisitive and over-intelligent. They know the skewers were or were not merchantable, and decide
to learn the truth. Surreptitiously they go out and attempt to sell the skewtA. B., 1924, LL. B., 1927, Harvard University; Author of A Business Tribunal for
Corporate Re-organization (1933) II HARV. Bus. REv. 178; Collaborator, CoDE oF ARRITRATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; member of the Massachusetts Bar; contributor to legal
periodicals.

' Cf. Wigmore, Administrative Boards and Commissions: Are the Jury-Trial Rules of

Evidence in Force for Their Inquiries? (1922) 1V ILL. L. REv. 263.

(230)

THE DETERMINATION OF BUSINESS FACT

ers on the open market, or better still give them to some good skewer salesman to sell. They find conclusively that they cannot be sold, the trade,
when approached as business men rather than as testifying experts, admit
their utter worthlessness. They return a verdict for the defendant.
After our mythical lawyer recovers from his shock, he would inform
us that the verdict would be promptly overturned, and the jury chastized
for their gross violation of duty. A mythical business man might inquire
as to whether the jury had not really reached a just verdict, and had not
determined the business truth of the matter, but would be buried under a
mass of legal terminology involving rights of cross-examination, larger
words if necessary, and a conclusion that the evidence presented by the parties at the trial was all the jury could use in reaching their verdict. What
matter that the jury was desirous of reaching "business truth"; "legal
truth" is what the evidence shows. And the mythical lawyer' would doilbtless be right in his contention that the jury could not go outside for facts.
The rules of evidence developed for jury trials are firmly established and
may conceivably provide the only equitable method of jury trial-but the
same arguments are hand-made demonstration of the limitations of jury
trial in connection with complicated types of business facts, and show no reason for the same methodology to be applied to other systems of resolving
controversies and disputes.
"Business truth" and "legal truth" 2 are all too frequently different,
and certainly are arrived at by an entirely different method of logical analysis. The needs of the two are dissimilar. 3 In purchasing dresses hearsay
evidence may be exactly what is necessary. A statement by Mrs. Jones that:
"All the women at Mrs. Smith's tea said they liked them", might mean far
more than any scientific expert's evidence about their quality in determining merchantability for purchase purposes. Yet in the jury trial of the same
issue, such testimony would be promptly and, it is submitted, properly excluded. The scientist would be disgusted at the logical method used by both
lawyers and business men; progress could be effectively stifled by the use
2 Cf. Isaacs, On Business Facts (1932) 6 CIN. L. REv. I; Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric
of ConstitutionalLaw (1918) J. OF PHIL., PsYcH. & SCIENTIFIC METHODS 645.

"Suppose that John Smith is suspected of being a thief. The allegation reaches his
fiancee, his employer, a grand jury and eventually a petit jury. The first would reach her
conclusions on the subject in .her own way. The employer might well say to himself: 'I
am only employing the man, not marrying him. I can give him the benefit of the doubt and
watch him.' Or he might feel that he had heard enough to justify the conclusion that he
should not keep the man in his employ. The grand jury, hearing the same evidence as that
placed before the others, might decide that however reasonable that conduct might have been
in view of their purposes, the man either should or should not be held for trial. And finally,
it is quite possible that though one would be foolish, under the circumstances, to marry him
or even employ him, it would be equally foolish without better evidence to convict him.
Thus for some purposes the truth found is in effect 'guilty' and for others 'not guilty'. The
'absolute' truth has not been touched in any of these cases-and in human affairs probably
cannot be." Isaacs, How Lawyers Think (1923) 23 COL. L.REv. 555, 557.
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of hearsay evidence or the doctrine of res judicata. The moralist in turn
often determines truth. by a broad utilitarian test, and thinks of truth as
that which will prove most beneficial to all concerned. 4 If a jury were in
doubt whether a defendant committed a tort, the solution according to the
moralist's "logic" is simple-he did not do it; a conclusion which would
benefit everyone far more than finding him culpable. And many other
methods of determining "truth" could be cited. No one, except a logician,
is really interested in pure truth. What we are attempting in all cases is
to find merely an approximate determination of fact to fit the individual
need and situation.
But even an approximate definition of fact may be difficult," and differ
according to need. The legal method of trial to determine fact has no logic
behind it unless the needs of trial and the reason therefor are present.
It is unfortunate that the rules to govern jury trials are called "The
Rules of Evidence". The name has too all-inclusive a ring about it; it is
too majestic and too sweeping when we consider that these rules are merely
"the method of aiding an untrained and inexperienced body of triers, newly
selected ad hoc for each trial and functioning in all kinds of litigation of
infinite variety" 6; rules adopted as a result of the rigidity of common law
procedure, lack of confidence in jurors, and the contentiousness of legal
proceedings in general. The limitation should be "Rules of Evidence for
Jury Trials". It must be frankly recognized that the determination of fact
is not the primary aim of our jury rules of evidence. Otherwise our jury
could have gone outside to get evidence about these particular skewers. The
law in its evolution has never stopped to ask: "What kind of fact is needed
to prove a case?"; but rather the law has said: "You can have this kind
of proof and only this kind", and soundly enough because it is the only
type adapted to our method of trial. A "business logic" approach would be
to see what kinds of fact are needed, and to that adapt rules of evidence.
This, to be certain, could not be done for jury trials, but it might well be
adapted to other methods of fact determination. Should our established
rules of hearsay, opinion evidence, privilege, outside determinations, judicial notice, for example, apply to commercial arbitrations?

4

Cf. FULERTON, AN INTRODUcTION TO PHILOSOPHY (i922) 296ff. "Objective evidence
and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and
(1897).
dream-visited planet are they found?" See passim JA ms, THE WILL To BELIE
'Cf. Henderson, Approximate Definition of Fact (I93z) 14 U. OF CALIF. PUBLICATIONS
IN PHILOSOPHY 179.

'Wigmore, supra note I, at 263, "Our law of evidence is largely a product of the jury
system. The purpose of its exclusionary rules is to keep from the jury not only all that is
irrelevant, but also much that, although relevant, is remote, or collateral, or non-probative,
and, therefore, tends to mislead or confuse." Pound, J., dissenting in Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 447, 113 N. E. 507, 511 (I916).
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II. Determinationof Fact ex parte in Commercia Arbitrations
Suppose in the skewer case set forth an arbitrator instead of a jury
were to determine the issue. Suppose he were an expert in ordinary skewers, but not in bamboo skewers which were being introduced on the market
for the first time. Suppose further that he could determine little from the
conflicting opinion of alleged experts (none of whose opinions the arbitrator
considered equal to his) or from the conflicting statements of the parties.
His natural inclination would be to make an expert survey and to attempt
to sell them himself and through his own salesmen. This was done in
Berizzi Co. v. KrausZ,7 with the result that the New York Court of Appeals

vacated an award based on the ex parte investigation showing that the goods
were unmerchantable. And this without the objecting party being required
or able to prove that the goods were in fact merchantable or that there was
any business evidence to this effect.8 The Court of Appeals stated:
"We think that the conduct of this arbitrator was misbehaviour
prejudicing the rights of one of the parties . . . what was contem-

plated was a hearing.

What ensued was a default." 9

Doubtless what ensued was not a hearing, if "hearing" is synonymous with
"trial"; sed non sequitur it was a default. The court further states:
"There would be little profit in fixing a time and place of hearing,
if the arbitrators were at liberty when a hearing was over to gather
evidence ex parte, and rest their award upon it." 10
There would be no point in fixing the time for a hearing if the parties
expected a jury hearing; but there is perfect consistency in granting the
parties a right to be heard, and also allowing an expert of the parties' own
choosing to decide the questions of fact in a fair manner if he deems it
worthy of an approximate determination of fact. By what right do our
courts assume that the business man desires something analogous to a trial
when he submits his dispute to arbitration? Certainly the modus operandi
of a determination of fact by a jury composed of men selected by lot from
which is excluded anyone who knows the slightest thing about the subject
matter should not be the same as that followed by experts selected by parties
to the dispute because they possess knowledge of the subject matter or know
7239 N. Y. 315, 146 N. E. 436 (1925).
The case is adversely criticized in Note (1925)
25 COL. L. REv. 822, 826; (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 9o5; and approved in (1925) 20 IT._ L. REV.

3o8. The decision of the Appellate Division which was reversed by the Court of Appeals in
the principal case is approved in Wheless, Arbitration as a Judicial Process of Law (1924)
30 W. VA. L. Q. 209. Cf. (1931) 172 L. T. 72.
'The unfairness of this rule is pointed out in Moore v. Butlin, 7 L. J. Q. B. (N. s.) 20
(1837) ; cf. Mercer v. Reid, 47 T. L. R. 574 (ig3i), aff'd 48 T. L. R. 331 (i3i).

'Berizzi v. Krausz, supra note 7, at 318, 320, 146 N. E. at 437, 438.
10Id. at 319, 146
N. E. at 437.
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how to determine it in a business-like manner-unless, without consideration of needs, the law arbitrarily says: "This is all you can have".
Arbitration is a growing force in the determination of business disputes. Numerous reasons are assigned for its growth, and its use in New
York City is surprising. Some turn to it for privacy, some for speed or
economy.'- But even if we had private, speedy, cheap jury trials, there
would still be a great number who would turn to arbitration because they
can obtain thereby an expert business judgment of the facts involved. Arbitrators are becoming chosen to greater extent because they are the outstanding experts in the field of dispute, and not because they will act as
champions of the party choosing them. Instead of burdening them with
anachronisms of trial, the law should synthesize the best of legal and business logic and allow arbitrators to utilize it. Legal rules of evidence in
force for historical reasons, or for their special fitness to juries, should not
be applied when there is no logical business reason for them.
Examine the methods built up and enforced by certain popular trade
12
tribunals and we find none of the ordinary legal anachronisms of trial.
For example, in the ordinary hide and leather arbitration in New York,
merchandise is submitted to experts who are uninformed of the identity
of the parties, who submit their contention anonymously, and who determine quality or quantity at least in an expert business manner. The
ordinary fur arbitration in New York City consists of a five or ten minute
explanation of the terms of the contract by the parties and then a thorough
ex parte examination of the merchandise by the expert arbitrators. And
13
trade tribunals use this method of fact determination to greater extent.
Business men naturally utilize these arbitrators because a business-like solution of a business problem is thereby evolved. When lawyers represent their
clients at such proceedings the former are at a loss and invariably seek to
prolong the proof of documents and statements by witnesses and minimize
the actual examination of merchandise. From the author's own observation a good trial lawyer is not always a good man to try a case before a
commercial arbitration board-the two do not speak the same language,
and certainly do not use the same logic. Many a good arbitration case has
been lost because the lawyer insists on his legal evidence and attempts to
'There are many excellent summaries of the advantages of arbitration. For an unusually clear statement see Sturges, Commercial Abitration or Court Application of Common
Law Rules of Marketing? (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 480.
ITHE YEAR BooK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1927) Oxford University Press, New

York City, prepared by the American Arbitration Association, contains a very complete
summary of the various rules of arbitration procedure in force in the United States.
"And in many trades arbitration "by correspondence" without an oral hearing is had.
See, for example, the Arbitration Rules of the American Fruit and Vegetable Shippers
Association, and the Arbitration Rules of the Interstate Cotton Seed Crushers Association, Inc.
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"soft pedal" the really relevant business facts which his client is so anxious
to present.
Nevertheless Berizzi v. Krausz is generally the law. 14 If the parties
consent to an ex parte examination the law will not object." In fact in
many states parties may, by contract, provide a procedure for the arbitrators to follow, and this with but few exceptions will be fully respected
by the courts. 6 This is generally accomplished by the agreement to arbitrate according to definite arbitration rules. But the arbitration rules are
all too often drafted by lawyers according to old jury rules.' 7 The business world at large rarely includes any procedure in its arbitration agreements. The agreement generally provides for "arbitration" but nothing
more and rules of evidence are sadly neglected even in agreements and rules
providing for detailed arbitration procedure. For example, few provide
for an independent investigation by arbitrators.' 8 When the arbitrators
propose such an examination at the hearing, and they most frequently do,
one or the other of the contestants invariably objects, especially if. lawyers
are present. The author has witnessed countless examples of this, and
learned of many more where the arbitrators nevertheless made an ex parte
examination-and "no one was the wiser".'" The plaintiff in Berizzi v.
Kraus was unfortunate in that the information of the arbitrator's actions
came to light.
There are few decisions in other states not in accord with Berizzi v.
Krausz where the arbitration resembled an appraisal. Thus in Bangor SavSee cases cited infra notes 27, 28, and 2g.
'Robins Silk Co. v. Consolidated Piece Dye Works, 224 App. Div. 83, 229 N. Y. Supp.
5oo (1928), aff'd 251 N. Y. 87, 167 N. E. 181 (1929); cf. Ketcham v. Odd Fellows, 59 Pa.
Super. 213 (915).
'

"Finsilver v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N. Y. 382, 171 N. E. 579 (193o); Matter of
Palmer & Pierce, Inc., 195 App. Div. 523, I86 N. Y. Supp. 369 (i92i) ; Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Blakely Oil Co., 137 Ga. 407, 73 S. E. 378 (I91); Fernandes Grain Co. v. Hunter
Grain Co., 217 Mo. App. 187, 274 S. W. 90o (925); cf. Katakura & Co. v. Vogue Silk
Hosiery Co., 307 Pa. 544, 161 Atl. 529 (1932).

" In Illinois, rules must be approved by a court to be legally effective.

Il. Ray.

STAT.

(Cahill, 1933) c. 10, § 2.

' There are, however, certain rules which provide for the ex parte examination of merchandise; for example, Rules of the National Association of Importers of Hides and Skins;
or for ex parte chemical examinations, for example, Rules of the United States Shellac
Importers' Association, Inc. In five states at least (California, Idaho, Nevada, New York
and North Dakota) the receiving of ex parte information would have to be done surreptitiously. For in those states the criminal laws incorporate the rule of Berizzi v. Krausz
by providing that any arbitrator who willfully receives any communication, book, paper,
instrument, or information relating to a cause or matter before him, except according to the
regular course of proceeding upon the hearing of that cause or matter, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
A recent interesting and very pointed case came to our attention in which a lawyer of
repute was acting as an arbitrator in a theatrical case. Under the contract the management
agreed'to indemnify the actor for any actual loss to his personal effects sustained during the
performance. A pair of black trousers was damaged beyond repair during the performance,
and the actor claimed damages not only for the trousers but for the entire suit as well. He
presented his tailor to testify that it was impossible to match black woolens perfectly-as
was necessary in a well-dressed actor. The management scoffed at the idea, and intimated
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ings Bank v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co.,20 the court stated: "The arbitrator may, for his own information, ask information from persons whose
capacity to form an accurate opinion concerning the subject matter he relies upon", and a few other cases would seem to support this view. 21 In
other states it would seem that the independent investigations are proper
if the parties are later notified and have a chance to cross-examine any evidence received.2 2 In California the rule formerly was that so long as the
arbitrator formed his own opinion the independent investigation was not
fatal. 23 It is submitted that the rule in Berizzi v. Krausz is unsound, and
that arbitrators should be permitted to make independent investigation. No
award should be upset unless a fundamental prejudice to the complaining
party can be shown.
Berizzi v. Krausz did allow sbme exceptions, proving that there is nothing so fundamental about its rule that an opposite one would be against public policy. The court said:
"We do not mean, of course, that an award will be vitiated by investigations in the absence of the parties if directed towards facts of
trifling importance or facts of such a nature as to preclude reasonable
contest. This may include views or the ascertainment of physical conditions notorious and permanent." 24
Thus, the conditions of rollers in a mill, alleged to have damaged merchandise, were held a "physical condition, notorious and permanent", 25 permitting ex parte examination; and confirmatory tests, made ex parte by the
arbitrators of tests made or authorized at the hearing, were not fatal to an
that the tailor and actor were both angling for a new suit. The arbitrator unhesitatingly
decided in his own mind that the actor's claim was preposterous, but did, before rendering
his final award, consult his own tailor on the point. The latter agreed perfectly with the
actor, whereupon the arbitrator found ample corroboration from woolen manufacturers and
discovered the trade reason why black woolens cannot be matched to satisfaction. Perfect
justice was undoubtedly accomplished in the case; though it is just as certain that under
Berizzi v. Krausz the award would have been vacated. We doubt whether by any other
method than an outside investigation the real truth could have been obtained. Were the
normal trial method followed, each side could undoubtedly have found experts to testify as
desired about matching wool, and the arbitrator would have been even more in doubt as to
the real situation than had no testimony been taken.
85 Me. 68, 26 Atl. 99' (1892).
Straw v. Truesdale, 59 N. H. lO9 (1879) ; Dechant v. Globe etc. Fire Ins. Co., 94 Wis.
579, 217 N. W. 322 (1928).
' Christianson v. Norwich Fire Ins. Society, 84 Minn. 52 6 , 88 N. W. I6 (igoi).
' Simons v. Mills, 8o Cal. 18, 22 Pac. 25 (1889)
I Supra note 7, at 320, 146 N. E. at 438. This exception, or perhaps even a broader one,
has been recognized since early times in Pennsylvania. "If referees make enquiries abroad,
to ascertain for their own satisfaction, the price of work, or the truth of any other matter,
which may be said, comparatively, to be of a public nature, this, so far from being irregular,
would be highly commendable. But it is a very different case, when they proceed separately
to examine a witness, who has been produced by one of the parties, although the evidence
relates only to those general points. The adverse parties should have an opportunity of
cross-examining the witness." Chaplin v. Kirwan, i Dall. 2 4 (Pa. 1786).
'Robins Silk Co. v. Consolidated Piece Dye Works, supra note 15.
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award. 26 The courts of New York now apparently recognize the business
hardships of Berizzi v. Krausz, and are attempting to break away from its
rigors.
We do not mean that arbitrators should surreptitiously consult the
parties, 27 or hear witnesses ex parte at the suggestion of one side; 28 this
would obviously be unfair. Business logic does not call for such tactics.
Neither do we mean that arbitrators should obtain ex parte the opinions of
others on the case,2 9 and without determining the facts themselves adopt
' Matter of Gerli & Co. v. Heineman, 258 N. Y. 484, i8o N. E. 243 (1932) ; Horowitz v.
Kaplan, 221 App. Div. 567, 224 N. Y. Supp. 498 (1927). Contra: McKinney v. Page, 32
Me. 513 (I85I).

' Such consultation will vitiate an award without the necessity of showing that the
The language of
conference was prejudicial. Rand v. Peel, 74 Miss. 305, 21 So. 10 (896).
the cases would indicate such conference vitiates the award ipso facto; but Whitney v.
Church, 91 Conn. 684, Ioi Atl. 329 (917), held the party conferred with could not complain.
And in Thompson v. Edwards, 220 Ky. 239, 294 S. W. lO95 (1927) consultation ex parte of
one party's attorney was held not fatal without showing prejudice to the other, the complaining party. Where one party submitted a new statement of his case ex parte the award was
vacated, without the proof of prejudice. Cleland v. Hedly, 5 R. I. 163 (1858) ; the furnishing of legal citations ex parte had the same effect in Hewitt v. Village of Reed City, 124
Mich. 6, 82 N. W. 616 (i9oo5; receipt of a paper from one party--even after the arbitrator's
mind was fully made up, and not changed by the paper-was cause for vacation of the award
in Jenkins v. Liston, 13 Gratt. 535 (Va. 1856) ; showing an arbitrator ex parte a newspaper
vacated an award without the complaining party being required to show there was anything
prejudicial therein in Wilkins v. Van Winkle, 78 Ga. 557, 3 S. E. 761 (1887); showing a
map likewise proved fatal in Whitehair v. Kansas Flour Mills Corporation, 127 Kan. 877,
275 Pac. I9 (1929) (citing Berizzi v. Krausz). The cases in this paragraph go far; and
it is submitted that where the complaining party is unable to prove prejudice by the ex parte
communication the award should not be vacated. Cf. Small v. Trickey, 41 Me. 507 (1856).
And certainly if the other party can show affirmatively there was no prejudice in the ex parte
communication, the award should be allowed to stand.
'And the courts so hold-without proof of prejudice. Catlett v. Dougherty, 114 Ill.
568, 2 N. E. 669 (x885). But where the arbitrators on their own initiative consult witnesses
outside the regular hearing, the remarks about Berizzi v. Krausz contained in the text are
partially applicable, and probably no award should be vacated unless prejudice can be shown,
and clearly the award should stand when the non-objecting party can show no prejudice. The
latter doctrine was advanced in Jackson v. Roane, go Ga. 669, 16 S. E. 65o (1893). Many cases,
however, hold such consultation of a witness ipso facto fatal to the award. Hickey v. Grooms,
4 J. J. Marshall 125 (Ky. 183o) ; Rosenau v. Legg, 82 Ala. 568, 2 So. 441 (1887) ; Larson v.
Nygaard, 148 Minn. lO4, i8o N. W. OO2 (1921). Of course, there are certain circumstances
where the outside consultation of witnesses might be fatal, e. g., in Sullivan v. Frink & Co.,
3 Iowa 66 (1856), the defendant admitted liability in a tort case and the arbitrators announced that they would therefore hear only evidence of damage. After the hearings were
closed, the arbitrators independently consulted the witnesses whom the plaintiff was to present to prove liability, and damages obviously punitive in nature were awarded. Held, (and,
under the facts, it is submitted, properly) the award should be vacated. On the other hand,
there are a few liberal decisions where the court examined all the facts and allowed the
award to stand; e. g., the consultation of a handwriting expert by the arbitrators was held
not fatal in Redman v. St. Joseph Hay and Grain Co., 2o9 Mo. App. 682, 239 S. W. 540
(1922) and the rehearing of a witness unknown to the parties was held not fatal in Plumner
v. Sanders, 55 N. H. 23 (1874). The Pennsylvania rule would seem to be that receiving
ex parte a party's statement, or examining a witness not in the presence of the parties, will
ipso facto vitiate an award. Speer v. Bidwell, 44 Pa. 23 (1862). Suppose one arbitrator has
knowledge of facts which he does not communicate to the parties, but tells the other arbitrators after the hearing is closed? On the jury analogy, of course, the award would be
vacated; on the theory of "expert judge" the award would stand. Cf. Straw v. Truesdale,
supra note 21; Jones v. Northern Assurance Co., 182 Ky. 701, 207 S. W. 459 (1919).
'And the courts correctly so hold. David Harley Co. v. Barnefield, 22 R. I. 267, 47
Atl. 544 (19oo). The parties are certainly entitled to the judgment of the arbitrators.
Sometimes this may cause hardship, however, as for example when a complicated set of
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such opinions as their award. But arbitrators should be able to reach a
business-like verdict by business-like methods of fact finding.
English cases frequently, in spite of more rigid rules regarding
arbitrations, recognize "commercial arbitrations" as apart from the ordinary
trial or ordinary arbitration, and allow business usages and custom to prevail in the arbitrators' determination of fact. 30 No American decision has,
however, adopted the English view.
Even in the United States the arbitration agreement may be such as
to indicate that the expert arbitrators are to decide the case without the introduction of any evidence, let us say as to value or quality of merchandise.
Such agreements will be enforceable, and the arbitrators may decide the
case on their own knowledge. 31 But suppose the arbitrator, in anticipation
of the proceeding makes himself an expert, and searches for evidence so as
to be better enabled to judge the results of the trial. Suppose the arbitrator
in Berizzi v. Krausz had made an independent investigation of bamboo
skewers before the hearing, and then had listened without prejudice to all
the evidence presented? On the analogy to jury trial, of course his award
would be vacated, on the analogy to the "expert" arbiter, the award would
stand- The law is hazy and generally the courts when called upon to decide the question skillfully evade it.3 2 lOddly enough, in early jury history
figures arises and the arbitrators consult an accountant and bodily adopt his judgment. This
was held fatal in Shipman v. Fletcher, 82 Va. 6oi (1886). But obtaining an opinion of a
lawyer by non-legal arbitrators under a submission where they were bound to find according
to law, and where the opinion was given only in answer to a hypothetical question, was held
not fatal to the award in Stone v. Baldwin, 226 Ill. 338, 86 N. E. 89o (i9o7). There is a
generally recognized exception in construction cases. Where the general engineer is named
as arbitrator in the contract, he may adopt the opinion of the engineer on the job. Royal
Indemnity Co. v. Batson-Cook Co., 37 Ga. App. 797, 142 S. E. 210 (1928). Cf. also Whitney v.
Church, supra note 27, holding that if the arbitrator's conduct is made known to the parties
and they do not protest, the award will stand. In England it is a common practice for a lay
board of arbitrators to employ a "legal assessor" whose function it is to advise them on all
legal questions arising during the arbitration and on whose opinion they are free to rely. See
the Arbitration Rules of the British Empire Chambers of Commerce; cf. Westwood & Co. v.
Cape of Good Hope Government, 2 T. L. R. 667 (1886).
o See, for example, French Government v. S.S. Tsurushima Maru, 37 T. L. R. 961
(1921).

"Gammon v. McClannahan, 204 Ky. 67, 263 S. W. 770 (1924) ; Wiberly v. Matthews,
91 N. Y. 648 (1883); cf. Cobb. v. Dolphin Mfg. Co., io8 N. Y. 463, 15 N. E, 438 (1888);
McManus v. Philadelphia, 2O Pa. 632, 51 Atl. 322 (19o2). And see the interesting analogy
in administrative immigration law: "But the statute does not require inspectors to take any
testimony at all, and allows them to decide on their own inspection and examination the
question of the right of any alien immigrant to land." Nishimura Ekiu V, United States,
142 U. S. 651, 663, 12 Sup. Ct. 336, 340 (892).
"In re American Trading Co., N. Y. L. J., Feb. 11, 1926, aff'd 216 N. Y. Supp. 793
(1926), held such action would be fatal if by an impartial arbitrator or umpire, but not for a
"party-selected arbitrator"; Matter of Elmhurst-Gleane Corporation, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 31,
I93i, did not consider such conduct fatal but the facts of the case show the parties had knowledge of the arbitrator's conduct. In Moshier v. Shear, io2 Ill. i69 (1881) the jury analogy
was absolutely followed and an award vacated without the complaining parties being required to prove prejudice because of the facts learned prior to the arbitration. The court
said: "After being selected it is the duty of an arbitrator, like a juror, to act . . . on. the
evidence adduced before them at trial and what will be misconduct on the part of the juror
will, as a general rule, be such on the part of an arbitrator. Neither has a right to learn
facts except as brought to his attention in the trial." Id. at 173. On the other hand, City of
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the jurymen were chosen because of their knowledge--the courts today
seem to forget that in the formulation of rules to govern not only jury
trials, but any other determination of fact.
In general, arbitration is of two types: common law and statutory. 33
The common law arbitration is unsatisfactory; the common law arbitration
agreement is revocable, and the award at best is enforceable by suit. Statutory arbitration agreements are irrevocable, and the award is enforceable
by speedy motion procedure. The latter type of arbitration is held out as
the only type to use by leading experts on the subject,3 4 and there is much
propaganda and effort to have statutory arbitration strengthened. The principles of the New York statute have been copied in many states, and are
being urged on practically every other legislature in the United States. As
Berizzi v. Krausz arose under the New York statute, that decision and
statutory arbitration in general are of paramount importance in moulding
arbitration law throughout this country. 35
Bridgeport v. Eisenman, 47 Conn. 34 (1879), required that prejudice resulting from the evidence gathered be shown before the award would be set aside. And see The Guldborg, I F.
Supp. 38o (S.D. N. Y. 1932), wherein the court states that the doctrine of Berizzi v. Krausz
does not apply to the use of information gained prior to the hearing.
See STURGES, Comm ciAL ARBITRATIONS AND AwARDs (I930) Ch. I. There is no
statutory arbitration in Oklahoma and South Dakota.
'The entire CODE OF ARBrrATION OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL (i931)
for example, is based on this assumption.
' See DRAFT STATE ARBITRATION ACT, distributed by the American Arbitration Association; Eastman, A Plea for Uniform. Laws on Arbitration (Feb. 1929) MAGAZINE OF
BUSINESS I42. Pennsylvania adopted the Draft State Arbitration Act in 1927, PA. STAT.
5, §§ i61-181. In addition, however, there are three other arbitraANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit.
tion acts upon the Pennsylvania statute books: the Voluntary Submission Act, id. §§ 1-i2o;
the Compulsory Arbitration Act, id. §§2I-11o; and the Reference Act, id. §§2oi-2o9; and
besides id. §§ ii-i8o contains certain provisions applicable to all arbitrations. It is thought,
however, that most of the arbitrations held in Pennsylvania will be held under the Draft
Act; certainly it is the only one whereby a provision in a contract to arbitrate a dispute
thereafter arising can be enforced. Cf. Bashford v. West Miami Land Co., 295 Pa. 56o, 145
Atl. 678 (1928). It is strange that this multiplicity of acts was allowed to stand in the
revisions made in 1927. An excellent and thorough treatment of the Pennsylvania arbitration law is contained in Sturges, ArbitrationUnder the New PennsylvaniaArbitration Statute
(1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 345. See also, Seigrist, Construction of the Arbitration Act of
1927 (1931) 35 DicxixsoN L. REv. 240, condemning the limitation in Grote v. Stein, 99 Pa.
Super. 556 (I93O), refusing to apply the act to an appraisal. While we agree with the article
that the act might well apply to appraisals, we feel that it has overlooked much Pennsylvania
law in this connection. See Marcus v. Safeguard Insurance Co., (1929) 77 Prrs. LEG. J.
741. An unusually good court analysis of the arbitration law appears in Katakura and Co.,
Ltd. v. Vogue Silk Hosiery Co., I5 D. & C. 389 (Pa. 1931). While the case was reversed on
technical grounds id. nomine, supra note 16, that does not detract from its excellent exposition. As a matter of fact the Pennsylvania act, copied as it was from the principles of the
New York Arbitration law, N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1920) § 1448-65, will doubtless be subject
to the influence of the New York decisions which certainly are much more pertinent to its
construction than are the early Pennsylvania cases decided before 1927. The literature on
the subject must be used with great care, a great part of it being propaganda, ghost-written
or otherwise, and in many ways unreliable. On the other hand, there is some excellent
material. STURGES, op cit. supra note 33, is invaluable to the practitioner or student in the
field. Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration (1927) 40 HAav. L. REv. 929, is very
fundamental; while RussEuL, ARBITATION AND AwARD (Aaronson, i2th ed. i931) is helpful
when there are no American decisions on the subject, in showing the English experience under
an act similar in many ways to the Pennsylvania statute.
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III. Rules of Evidence in Commercial Arbitrations-Materiality
Ex parte examination and the analogous problems raised by Berizzi
v. Krausz are but a rather spectacular example of a fundamental problem
-the extension of the rules of evidence beyond their original sphere, the
jury trial. One could take countless other rules of evidence and write similar expositions thereon-in fact not only the rules of evidence could be
treated, but other fact determining proceedings as well as arbitrations could
be included."6
Several arbitration statutes at the very outset limit the arbiters to a
very strict compliance with all the rules of evidence. 37 For example, the
Washington Arbitration Act reads:
"The laws in force in this state relating to evidence .
govern in arbitrations." 31

.

.

shall

Such statutes obviously fail to recognize the needs of arbitration or the
distinction between business truth and legal truth.
In all jurisdictions the arbitrators are unnecessarily handicapped by
evidence rules. "It is plain that the courts do allow considerable latitude
in practise at any rate, to the reception of evidence by [arbitrators] but
to say as a general proposition that they are not bound by rules of evidence
appears to me to be entirely misleading and likely to produce very great
injustice." 39 Even in the most liberal states, arbitrators must hear "all
'For studies of such questions consult Wigmore, supra note I;Ross, The Applicability
of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings before Workmen's Compensation Commissions (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 263; Sherman, Evidence and Proof Under Workmen's
Compensation Laws (i92o) 68 U. OF PA. L.REv. 2o3; (1916) 16 CoL. L. REv. 81; (1915) 29
-ARv. L. REv. 2o8; (1922) 26 id.79; (1923) 18 111- L. Rv. 248; (1915) 14 MicH. L. REv.
158; (1916) 15 id.175; (1925) 9 MINN. L. REv. 576; (1916) 64 U. OF PA. L. REV. 325;

(1917)

65 id. 377; (1917)

26 YAsE L. J. 334.

The business aspects of the problems are

generally neglected. See McCauley v.Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa.312, 104 Atl. 617 (1918)
and cases following that decision for Pennsylvania rules on the subject. Professor E. M.
Morgan maintains that the rules which require opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses and opportunity to meet and refute evidence are not part of the law of evidence but
essentials of our adversary system of litigation. (But see supra note 6.) It is possible that
we are using the word "evidence" in a very broad sense. We feel, however, that the difference betwen us is one of terminology and classification rather than any particular disagreement as to substance.
' Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington. The
oaths required of arbitrators in many states would seemingly limit arbitrators in their rulings
on evidence. See STURGES, op. cit. supra note 33, at 454 et seq.
REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 427. The situation in Pennsylvania in this
'WASH.
respect is most confusing. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 28, § 311, specifically includes
arbitration as a judicial proceeding, thereby making many of the rules of evidence in Chapter
2 of Title 28 applicable to arbitrations. On the other hand, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o)
tit. 5,§ 121 (II) states that the arbitrators have power "to judge the competency and credibility of witnesses and the propriety of admitting any written evidence that may be offered".
Quwere whether this allows court review of the arbitrators' rulings and whether the arbitrators would be bound to follow the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title 28. The matter should
have been cleaned up in the revisions made in 1927. It shows how careful one must be in the
field of arbitration; there are many conflicting statutes, and little effort is being made to
correct them, except with regard to the propagandists' demand of irrevocability of arbitration
agreements.
' See In re Enoch and Zaretzky, Bock & Co.'s Arbitration, [191o] I K. B. 327, 336.
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pertinent and material evidence". 40 Such a test would be manifestly fair,
if the arbitrators were the judge of the pertinency and materiality; but
their ruling is subject to judicial interpretation, and courts judge materiality by judicial and not by business standards. 41 It is in effect adopting
a jury standard for business determination of fact. Naturally, unbiased
fair arbitrators will admit all evidence which is material to them; if they
are prejudiced or unfair their award will be set aside because of that fact.
But it seems ridiculous to require arbitrators to admit evidence merely
because it is material for a jury who must judge according to set legal rules,
and who must determine fact from their ignorance as enlightened by evidence material according to legal standards. For the arbitrators judge
from their own knowledge and according to their own law enlightened by
what they feel is necessary for an accurate determination of fact.
Since the more liberal states do not complain if arbitrators admit
irrelevant evidence 42 the net result is the transformation of what should
be a speedy, expeditious proceeding, into a lengthy drawn-out affair. Experienced arbitrators have learned it is wise to admit any evidence that
' In Mississippi and Missouri the arbitration statute affirmatively provides that the
arbitrators shall hear all the allegations and proofs which are material and pertinent to
the cause; in Kentucky the arbitrators must hear all testimony offered by either party relative to the matters in controversy; in New York and Wisconsin the arbitrators are affirmatively directed to hear "all the allegations and proofs of the parties"; while in California,
Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming the statutes provide for vacation of the award where
the arbitrators excluded "pertinent or material evidence". But here, as in the other evidential
problems raised below, there must be an offer of proof, and exception taken to the rulings of
an arbitrator before the award can be upset for an evidential error. See, for example,
Donahue & Son v. Barclay, White Co., Inc., 9 D. & C. 303 (Pa. 1927); Ketcham v. Odd
Fellows, supra note 15; Hewitt v. Lehigh & Hudson River Ry., 57 N. J. Eq. 511, 42 Atl.
325 (1899). Before the passage of the Draft Act in Pennsylvania the arbitrators had much
broader powers with respect to evidence. "They were constituted by the parties the ultimate
judges of the competency of the witnesses and of the admissibility, weight, and relevancy of
the evidence; . . ." March v. Lukens, 214 Pa. 2o6, 209, 63 Atl. 427, 428 (19o6).
"Cf. McLaurin v. McLauchlin, 215 Fed. 34 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) ; Pacific Lime & Gypsum Co. v. Missouri Bridge & Iron Co., 286 Mo. 112, 226 S. W. 853 (1920). It is true that
materiality is intimately connected with substantive law. But here, it must be borne in mind
that the law in an arbitration is what the arbitrators decide it to be. An error in law on their
part will not vitiate an award.
' Of course, in the less liberal states where the arbitrators must follow legal rules of
evidence absolutely, they are generally all at sea in their rulings, and harassed ly any objection made to evidence. In Rhode Island, e. g., an award will be vacated if they admit "legally
immaterial evidence". Cf. Bivans v. Utah Lake, Land, Water, and Power Co., 53 Utah 6Ol,
z74 Pac. 1126 (I918).
Oftentimes what is immaterial legally may be very material from a "business-arbitral"
viewpoint. Cf., e. g., the arbitration rules of the American Spice Trade Association providing
for the admission of previous offers of settlements if in writing to determine who should pay
the costs of the arbitration. Note also the odd Business Statute of Frauds.
In general the admission of incompetent evidence' by an administrative tribunal will not
prove fatal. Tagg Bros. v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct. 22o (1930). But unlike
the general arbitration rule, the administrative tribunal must have some evidence to support
its findings, and cannot rely on its own knowledge entirely. See Chicago Junction Case, 264
U. S. 258, 263, 44 Sup. Ct. 317, 319 (1924) ; Interstate C. C. v. Union Pan. R. R., 222 U. S.
541, 547, 32 Sup. Ct. 1O8, III (1911). Cf. Faris, Judicial Notice by Administrative Bodies
(1928) 4 IN!D. L. J. 167.
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is offered, and then privately to consider what they please. 43 For their
45
decision in weighing the evidence 4' and their law of the case is final.
The case of Levy v. Shamrock Construction Company 46 consumed nine
days, because the arbitrators, all outstanding building experts, were forced
to listen to testimony of other building men regarding their opinion and
viewpoints on the construction of a building which the arbitrators had previously examined. Had the arbitrators been safely able to exclude such evidence, the arbitration would have been over in a few hours. Legally, the
evidence was competent, actually the arbitrators, being human, needed none
but their own opinion to guide them. And that was all they used! In Fay
v. DuPuis, Reni-David and Company 4 7 the plaintiff alleged the defendant
brokers had wrongfully closed a margin account. The contract presented by the plaintiff showed that the broker had the right to make the
sale. Fay argued that he could show a waiver-the defendant had allowed him and many others more time than was specified in the margindemand wire on previous occasions. The contract, by its terms, was
specific in providing that previous waivers were of no effect. "When you
deal in securities, you must play the rules as announced in your contract,"
said the board. The clerk of the arbitration prevented them from giving
a formal decision then and there, and persuaded them to listen to all the
evidence the plaintiff offered for several days. The board returned a
verdict for the defendant, grumbling as they did so that their minds were
made up as soon as they read the contract. To them as final judges the
facts which the plaintiff presented were clearly immaterial-but to a court
viewing the case with a legal eye the evidence would have been clearly material. I do not hold this out as a very fair case; the arbitrators might have
been wrong in their ideas of waiver, but assuming they were going to decide the way they did, why should they be compelled to listen for days to
evidence they knew would have no effect on them?
I Cf. CODE OF ARBITRATION OF THE AmExIcAN ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL (1931) 118: "It
is a safe rule for the arbitrators to admit any evidence which may have a bearing on the
case." But note if the admission of immaterial evidence goes to such extremes that the
arbitrators are prejudiced thereby or award on matters not submitted, the award may be
vacated. Cf. Austin v. Clark & Crump, 8 W. Va. 236 (1875).
The dangers, however, of failing to admit evidence which might be pertinent in the
court's opinion is illustrated by Marr v. Marr, 103 Pa. 463 (1883). The courts will often
decide that the "examination is inadequate and the conduct of the arbitrators arbitrary", and
set aside the award. Witmer v. Royal Insurance Co., 33 LANC. L. REv. 345, 350 (1916). On
the other hand, when too much immaterial evidence is admitted, to "play safe", we have the
situation described in Campbell v. Rockey, 40 C. C. 177 (Pa. 1912) : "The history of this
action illustrates how futile are many of the experiments and devices to improve upon the
trial by jury and the order of the procedure of our courts as now constituted."
" Itoh and Co. v. Boyer Oil Co., 198 App. Div. 881, x91 N. Y. Supp. 29o (1921) ; Boomer
Coal & Coke Co. v. Osenton, I1 W. Va. 683, 133 S. E. 381 (1926).
"See infra p. 246.

" The names in the arbitration cases herein cited are fictitious, but the facts are authentic.
" Cf. Hart v. Kennedy, 47 N. J. Eq. 51, 2o Atl. 29 (189o).
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The determination of the two general headings of evidence-materiality and relevancy-should be for the arbitrators, if no prejudice is
shown. Of course the parties should have the right to be heard, and the
right to cross-examination of the evidence presented by the opposing side
should be present, 48 though if the parties are willing to waive it, such waiver
49
will be respected by the courts.

IV. Rules of Evidence in Commercial Arbitrations-Competency
The other general evidence heading, competency, offers more difficulties.
The courts generally say that the arbitrators, knowing no legal rules, cannot
be held to strict accounting on this score. 50 Many competency rules are designed to protect the unsuspecting jury from seemingly sound evidence with
but little probative force. With these the business arbitrators need not be concerned; they can do their own weighing. Hearsay, discreetly weighed, can be
immensely valuable."' On the other hand, there are many rules of competency which are adopted for reasons of public policy, irrespective of jury
trial. These the arbitrator should be forced to respect. For instance the
physician-patient privilege should apply to arbitrations as well as jury trials.
Georgia is the only state with specific statutory provisions regarding competency in arbitration. 5 2 One Michigan case considered the physicianpatient privilege and because of the peculiar mandatory wording of the statute regarding it, held that a fraternal organization in a proceeding somewhat analogous to an arbitration could not consider the physician's testimony. 3 The case is unique, however, and the question of public policy
behind competency rules does not seem to have occurred to the courts in
4

connection with arbitrations.5

An examination of specific problems raised by particular rules of evidence in the light of usage in arbitrations is most constructive. The parol
evidence rule is an enigma to law students, worried as they are as to
whether it is a question of substantive or adjective law. Professor Nathan
' Dana v. Dana, 26o Mass. 460, 157 N. E. 623 (1927).
" McDonald v. Real Estate Board of Baltimore, 155 Md. 377, 142 Atl. 261 (1928).
1 "Arbitrators are not usually lawyers, and a rule making the validity of their award
depend on the legal correctness of their action upon the competency of testimony would operate to defeat the purpose of the statute on that subject." Lumbard v. Holdiman, 115 Ill. App.
458,461 (19o4).

But cf. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., supra note 6; Englebretson v. Industrial
For a case supporting the viewAccident Commission, 170 Cal. 793, 151 Pac. 421 (915).
point of the text see Anderson Trading Co. v. Brimberg, 119 Misc. 784, 197 N. Y. Supp. 289
But see McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., supra note 36. "Whatever foundation
(1922).
there may be for objections to the rule excluding hearsay in its full extent, it must be
admitted that there is still a large residuum of necessary protection involved in it." See
Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 254, x27 Atl. 85o, 852 (1925).
24 MICH. L. REV. 831.
I GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 5041; and see supra note 33.

Cf. Note (1926)

'Dick v. Supreme Body of the International Congress, 138 Mich. 372, loi N. W. 564

(1904).

rCf. Hickman v. London Assurance Corp., 184 Cal. 524, 195 Pac. 45 (1920); Chafee,
The Progressof the Law (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 683, 684, 685.
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Isaacs explains it simply to his students in business by pointing out that
when the parol evidence rule prevents oral testimony from getting to the
jury, it is operating as a rule of evidence; when the judge considers it in
his rulings, he is using it as substantive law. Arbitrators, judging from
experience and records in many arbitrated cases, refuse to admit oral testimony concerning written documents to an extent unknown in law. Untutored in the intricacies of it, they believe the parol evidence rule is absolute; to them it is a rule of substantive law, or in their own minds "business
law". They, as final judges of the law and facts, should not be held
accountable for a rule which is partially substantive and partially a rule to
prevent juries from running contra to substantive law. In the few times
the question has been presented to the court as to the effect of the parol
evidence rule on arbitrators, we find little light. One case said the matter
was a question of the law of evidence and hence in the discretion of arbitrators; 55 another, after a lengthy legal discussion, showed as a matter of
complicated law that the arbitrators were correct in their ruling.56
Suppose in an arbitral hearing a witness's memory proves blank and
attempts are made to revive it by the use of documents and then efforts
are made to introduce the record of the witness's past recollections. Suppose, on the other hand, the attempt is made only to refresh a witness's
memory. It is obvious that business men cannot distinguish between the
two and, as a practical matter, will cut corners by politely requesting the
witness to let them see the papers in any event. Qucere if the law should
allow them to do so. One court held that allowing the arbitrators to see
records of a writing merely refreshing a witness's memory was grounds
for vacation of the award; 57 while another held that even the examination
of the entire file of documents in a party's possession was not fatal.58 It
is submitted that the latter decision is sounder from the business viewpoint
and the former justified only if we deem the arbitrators to be analogous to
jurors.
The courts which adopt the view that the entire matter of evidence,
except materiality,5 9 is for the arbitrators, find hardship in other ways.
Suppose, for example, that a party seeks to attack a judgment presented as
evidence in an arbitration on collateral grounds, clearly it is against public
policy to allow arbiters as well as juries to pass on their merits, and yet one
court allowed the arbitrators to do so 60 holding that the only time the court
' Brodhead-Garrett Co. v. Davis Lumber Co., 97 W. Va. 165,
'In

x24

S. E. 6oo (1924).

re Curtis and Castle Arbitration, 64 Conn. 501, 30 Atl. 769 (1894).

Matter of di Martino v. Guarnera, N. Y. L. J., February 25, 1926, Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
Bronx County.
'In
re American Trading Company, supra note 32; and cf. BeaU v. Board of Trade,
164 Mo. App. 186, 148 S. W. 386 (1912), refusing to vacate an award because the arbitrators
considered documents used by a witness to refresh his memory.
' Johnson v. Noble, i3 N. H. 286 (1842).
' Baker v. Merrifield, 13 N. H. 357 (1843).
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would interfere with arbiters was when they excluded material evidence.
Suppose arbitrators entirely reject a book of accounts under circumstances
which would make it admissible in a court of law, or suppose they admit
a book of accounts under circumstances, for example to prove a debt, which
would clearly bar its admission before a jury. Courts have sustained arbitrators in both these instances.6 1 And rightly, for men trained in business
need not worry about the pitfalls which would encompass the jury were
they to consider accounts promiscuously.6 2 Should the rules regarding
proof of documents apply? Clearly not, unless adopted for public policy,
such as the stamp rules in England. Neither should arbitrators, experts
themselves, be handicapped by our narrow rules regarding opinion evidence.

63

It certainly is clear that the rules of courts regarding evidence should
not be applicable to arbitration, yet in Georgia they are made applicable by
statute.6 4 One Maine case, in discussing the question, held that it would
be inexpedient as well as impractical to compel arbitrators to be held to
rules of court concerning evidence.6 5
There is a lesson to be derived from the struggles of arbitrators to
free themselves from the laws of evidence. Lawyers should not frown
too heavily upon the logic used by the business man in his pursuit of busiiness truth. Arbitration, except where there is no question of law at issue,
is at best a stop-gap. Merchants' courts were historically the place where
merchants were forced to settle their disputes. The law then gave them redress. Merchants' courts disappeared. But today merchants are so dissatisfied
with the law's procedure that they again are turning to their own tribunals.
Naturally, the law which offers such unsatisfactory remedies to business
should offer no resistance to this; it should not compel business to settle
its disputes in courts, but it should clean its own house and make its courts
fit the needs of modern business. 6 6 And meantime it should allow business
men to conduct their own tribunals in a business-like manner.
'Tyblewski v. Svea Fire and Life Assurance Co., 220 Ill. 436, 77 N. E. 196 (igo6);
Mulder v. Cravat, 2 Bay 370 (S. C. 182).
' But see the typical liberalized book of account statute of Michigan, MIcH. Comp. LAws
(1929) § 142o7. The hearsay rule is much modified, both as applied to trials and arbitrations. The modification, however, does not apply to certain types of businesses. Yet an
arbitrator, expert in one of the latter types, should be allowed to utilize books of accounts
according to his business experience. See Pennsylvania statutes cited supea note 38.
SBut see Hursh v. Gross, 2 York Leg. Rec. 175 (Pa. 1881).
"The examination of witnesses and the admission of testimony shall be governed by
the rules of the superior court." GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 5042.
'Waterman v. Merrow, 94 Me. 237, 47 Atl. 157 (19oo).
01"You and I would be derelict in our duty as lawyers and as judges if we attempted to
meet the problem of eradicating the defects in the administration of justice merely by resorting to arbitration because of these defects and these delays." Mack, Lectures on Legal Topics
(1929) 7 AssocIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF Nmv YoRic I07.
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V. Rules of Law in Commercial Arbitrations

In Great Britain, much more freedom is allowed arbitrators in their
methods of ascertaining facts; but a method is provided for court instruction of the arbitrators on the law to follow in their decisions, on the facts. 7
As was said in Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co.S:

"That they (arbitrations) will continue their present popularity,
I entertain no doubt, so long as the law retains sufficient hold over
them to prevent and redress any injustice on the part of the arbitrator and to secure that the law that is administered by the arbitratoris
in substance the law of the land, and not some homemade law of the
particulararbitratoror the particularassociation." (Italics inserted.)

We in turn handicap our arbitrators in their methods of discovering facts,
but allow them full play in their decisions on the law.6" Those prominent
in the advocacy and propagandizing of commercial arbitration would have
it this way.7 0 But in so doing they render arbitration even more of a stopgap than ever.
VI. Trade Associations and ArbitrationRules-Effect of N. R. A.

Arbitration in the United States today is roughly of three species:
(a) The casual unsupervised arbitration, informal, arranged with but
little thought to detail and administration. It is conducted by the parties
& Southwestern Junction Ry. v. Assessment Committee, etc., 13 App. Cas. 592
Acr, 52 & 53 VIcT. c. 49, §§ 7, 19 (1889). But cf. Arbitrator
Taking Evidence in Party's Absence (931) 72 L. J. 144.
[1922] 2 K. B. 478, 484.
'Cf. Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 392 (1875) ; Itoh & Co. v.
Boyer Oil Co., supra note 44. In Alabama, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington, however, awards not in accordance with the law will not be enforceable.
In Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming, provision is made for the reference
of questions of law by the arbitrators to courts, and similar limited provisions exist in Connecticut and Massachusetts. Note, however, the following provision in the Pennsylvania act:
"The arbitrators, or the parties to the arbitration with the approval of the arbitrators, shall
have the right to apply to the court, at any time during the arbitration proceedings for the determination of any legal question in accordance with the terms of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act. Such an application, however, shall not operate as a stay of proceedings,
unless the said arbitrators consent to such stay of proceedings." PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 5, § 177. Except for Snow v. Schulman, 352 Ill. 63, 185 N. E. 262 (1933), there
is no American lav on this or similar provisions. The English cases on a somewhat similar
statutory provision can be found in RussxLL, op. cit. supra note 35, 149-160, 314-321. Cf.
Grinnell, Functions of the Superior Court in Regard to Awards Under the Massachusetts
Commercial ArbitrationAct of 1925 (1926) II MASS. L. Q. 4.
7'The present trend is to pass statutes following the New York act, the so-called DRAFT
STATE ARBITRATioN Acr, supra note 35. The CoIlissioNERs' ARBITRATION ACT, in force
in Nevada, North Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming, providing for reference of questions of law
to the courts following the English practice, is bitterly opposed by the proponents of the
Draft Act, which has been recently adopted in twelve states (Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island and Wisconsin). These Draft Acts, well propagandized and ably fought for, are certain
to spread, and even when unsuccessful in the passage of the Draft Act, its proponents are
uniformly successful in preventing the passage of the Commissioners' Act.
'North

(1888); see ARBITrTi0N
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and arbitrators themselves. Even the most earnest advocates of arbitra71
tion admit that such arbitrations are failures.
(b) The trade arbitration, its success depending on the type of trade
association supervision given. But this type is satisfactory only for members of a trade group, and it is doubtful if a permanent solution of business
difficulties can be found in such functionalization. Certainly trade association arbitrations will not furnish a solution for business at large or for consumers in general.
(c) Supervised arbitrations before bodies specializing in arbitration
technique; e. g., Chambers of Commerce, The American Arbitration Association, etc. Some associations have built up a very thorough code for the
conduct of arbitrations. They are handicapped by the law of evidence, and
while proclaiming their success in propagandized publicity, privately admit
that they too are but a "stop-gap" and are seeking a hinterland to support
tribunals for the settlement of commercial controversies. Many follow a
very informal type of procedure, but the trend seems to be towards making
an arbitration more or less analogous to a trial, with dockets, pleadings,
72
depositions, and counsel present to present facts in true legalistic style.
The National Industrial Recovery Act has focused sharp attention on
the use of trade association and supervised types of arbitration in the settlement of commercial disputes. In many trades every effort is made to
cause merchants to submit their contractual disputes to arbitration; 73 many
Codes of Fair Competition provide for arbitration.7 4 These arbitrations
'See CODE OF ARIrrRATION OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL (1931) Ch. I.
' Id. Ch. VI. Even the order of the proceeding is made to resemble trial. See, for example, Rules of the American Arbitration Tribunal: "The order of the proceedings shall be
the recording of a Minute, setting forth the presence of the arbitrators and parties, the statement of the claim and of the answer, and the arrangements made for the hearing. The
complaining party, or his counsel, shall then present his case, call his witnesses and present
his proofs, and then submit to questions and examination on the proofs presented. The defending party, or his counsel shall then present his defense, call his witnesses and present his
proofs, submitting to questions and examination thereon. Exhibits offered by either party
may be received by the arbitrators, shall be marked for identification and made part of the

record."
' Even where the Codes do not contain such provision, the adoption by trade associations
of standardized contracts as a result of the N. I. R. A. will prove a great source of arbitration,
as many of these contracts will contain provisions for compulsory arbitration. Cf. ARBITRATION
PROVISIONS IN UNIFORM SALES OR PURCHASE CONTRACTS, published by the American Arbi-

tration Association (1933). Even before the present economic set-up many trade associations
required their members to arbitrate disputes with each other; see, for example, Grain Dealers'
National Association, Cocoa Merchants' Association of America, National Pickle Packers'
Association, American Cotton Waste and Linter Exchange. Some of the other trade association arbitration set-ups were unfair and were not enforced by the courts on the ground of
restraint of trade. Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation v. United States, 282 U. S.30, 51
Sup. Ct. 42 (I93O); Sono Art-World Wide Pictures, Inc. v. Lando (1931) 79 Prrrs. LEG. J.
518; R. K. 0. Corp. v. Moody (1932) 8o PITrs. LEG. J. 401. Cf. BIRDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND
BusINEss ETHICS (1926).

" See, for example, the Codes of the Cotton Textile Industry, the Crushed Stone and
Gravel Industry, Retail Lumber and Building Supplies, Wool Textile, Automatic Sprinklers
and Textile Machinery, Corset and Brassiere Industry. See also the account of the proposed
arbitration clause in the Millinery Code, (1933) I U. S. WEEKILY L. J.429. The provisions
in the Codes range from providing for arbitration in the matter of cost adjustment in pre-
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almost without exception are held under prearranged arbitration rules,75
and in view of the interest in the subject we have examined a large number of these rules with respect to the problems here raised.70 Most rules, unfortunately, fail to recognize the evidential problem at all. The most frequent mention of rules of evidence is to contrast the business method of
ascertaining fact with "technical rules of evidence". 77 The main idea seems
to be to stigmatize legal rules without considering how a business determination of the facts should be reached, or how to help the arbitrators to determine fact. The rules vie with each other in emphasizing the necessity of
admission of all pertinent evidence 78 or the exclusion of irrelevant evidence, 79 but the two are infrequently synthesized.8 0 Occasionally, the arbitrators are made absolute judges of what is necessary as evidence; I" in
other instances they are allowed to make their own rules of evidence, and
sometimes their decision on these matters is said to be final. s2 Occasionall j,
a more or less complete set of evidential rules is adopted. These, however,
are uniformly poor, and show little comprehension of the nature of the
task involved, as an examination of the example set forth will show. 83 The
existing contracts made necessary by the passage of the N. I. R. A. to the arbitration of all
disputes within a trade of a commercial nature. In a few instances effort is being made to
provide for arbitration as a method of enforcement of Codes.
'Arbitration is a procedure with which most trade groups are familiar, and in many
instances the adaptation of existing arbitral machinery will be sufficient, thus necessitating
no new and untried methods. See AnIm.&RxoIN PROVISIONS IN CODES OF FAIR Coaml'mErrIoN,
published by the American Arbitration Association (1933).
" A complete collection of arbitration rules of the various trade associations is contained
in YEAR Boosc ON Co mERciAL ARBITRATION, op. cit. supra note 12.
See, for example, the arbitration rules of the American Bleached Shellac Manufacturers
Association and American Cotton Waste and Linter Exchange. See also McCauley v.
Imperial Woolen Co., supra note 36, showing the interpretation the courts place on the phrase
"technical rules of evidence". See, however, the statement in the Arbitration Provisions of
the United Typothetze of America: "While the board may not be bound by legal rules of
evidence, it will exclude matters obviously unrelated, which are time consuming, or which
becloud the issue; but all evidence bearing on the case will be freely admitted. Proof is not
restricted to legal rules of evidence. Liberality of procedure is to be observed, and such
methods will be followed as will be best calculated to elicit all the evidence pertaining to the
case and at the same time meet the convenience of the members of the board and the parties
at issue." This should be carefully analyzed and compared with the doctrines previously
advanced in the text.
See, for example, the Rules of the American Arbitration Tribunal, Board of Trade of
the City of Chicago.
" The common provision is "all irrelevant or unimportant matters shall be excluded".
Association of Cotton Textile Merchants, Chamber of Commerce of State of New York
Arbitration Rules.
' "The arbitrators shall receive all the evidence bearing on the issue but may exclude
matters obviously unrelated which are time consuming and tend to becloud the issue. They
will not be bound by legal rules of evidence." Arbitration Rules of National Standard Parts
Association, American Bottlers of Carbonated Beverages.
' "The hearing shall continue until the arbitrators are unanimously agreed that all evidence necessary to a decision has been submitted." Arbitration Rules of the National Confectioners Association.
""Their admission and rejection of testimony shall be final." American Bleached
Shellac Manufacturers Association.
"E. g., "All interrogatories by, contestant shall be put by only one person on each side,
unless by consent of the arbitrator or arbitrators. The cross-examination of witnesses need
not be confined to matters testified to in the direct examination, but can be extended to any
matters necessary to make out the case of the party making the cross-examination. The
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truth of the matter seems to be that the professional sponsors of arbitration
have, rightly or wrongly, devoted so much attention to the procuring of laws
to make for the irrevocability of the arbitration agreement 84 or of making
certain that a particular trade association will administer the arbitration,
that they have neglected the procedural side-which to us is the far more
important one-with rather sad results.5 ,
VII. Standardized Contracts and UnstandardizedAwards
There had been a great impetus, even before the National Industrial
Recovery Act, towards supervised arbitration resulting from the use of
standardized arbitration clauses in standardized contracts. The arbitration
clauses in such contracts are generally inserted because of the dissatisfaction by business with court methods, though occasionally to prevent wild
claims particularly effective before juries, for example in stock-brokeragecustomers or warehousing contracts. But paradoxically enough, there has
been little standardization in results of the arbitrations, and effort is made
to prevent decided cases from being precedents.8 6
A series of warehouse cases will illustrate the last statement. The
Clarke Warehouse Company had several warehouses, only one of which
was fireproof. Its advertising matter and moving vans were gaily decorated
with the fireproof structure, and the wording of the former would lead
prospective customers to believe their goods were safe from all fire hazards
when stored. Their standardized contract provided, in small type, that the
company could store in any of its warehouses unless otherwise specifically
directed in writing, and the company under no circumstances would be liable for fire loss. One of its non-fireproof warehouses was destroyed by
fire, and court trials were prevented by the presence of an arbitration
re-examination shall be strictly confined to new matter introduced in cross-examination.
Witnesses shall be permitted to testify as to facts within their own personal knowledge, and
cannot be allowed to state information given them by others. The testimony must be confined
to the matters in controversy, and all irrelevant facts must be excluded. No impeachment
of the general reputation of a witness for veracity shall be permitted. Proof of agency must
be established before the admission of an agent can be received. The arbitrator or arbitrators
shall have the right to dismiss any case where the conflict in the testimony is such that it
may be deemed improper to give a decision." Rules of the Cincinnati Hay and Grain Exchange.
'See

Phillips, The Paradoxin Arbitration Law (1933)

46 HAgv.L. REv. 1258.

' Thus arbitration has not spread in the United States as was predicted. The failure or
success in a particular trade most frequently depends on the personality and knowledge of
the secretary of the trade association involved. Arbitration has become too much a matter
resting on personalities and not enough on general economic and legal principles. For
example, even the success of the American Arbitration Tribunal is due primarily to the fact
that the clerk of that tribunal is possessed with an unsurpassed knowledge of arbitration
procedure, and a personality which immediately gains the trust, admiration, and respect of
both participants and arbitrators. Without J. Noble Braden, its clerk, the American Arbitration Tribunal would have achieved little of its success. In fact, outside of New York,
where Braden holds forth, it has been uniformly unsuccessful in obtaining arbitration cases.
' CODE OF ARIiTRATION OF THE AmERICAN ARBITRATIoN TRIBUNAL, op. Cit. supra note 34
at 122. And see the scathing indictment of the DRAFT STATE ARBITRATION AcT and modem

arbitration on these grounds in the Second Report of the Texas Civil Judicial Council (193o)
lO1-io9. Cf. WmLsToN, SomE MODERN TENDENCIES OF THE LAW (1929) 56 et seq.
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clause. The variety of results reached by arbitrators on the same set of
facts as presented in different cases was limited only by the number of possibilities. One board flatly decided that the provisions on the contract governed and allowed no recovery; another refused to consider the fire limitation
and allowed full recovery; another thought that the burden of proof was
on the plaintiff to prove deceit by the advertising; another that the burden
was on the defendant to prove that the advertising was not misleading. One
rather prominent New York lawyer advised his client to accept a nominal
settlement on the ground that the terms of the contract obviously prevented
recovery before a board of arbitrators. The results of the previous cases
were private, and, alas, he was never informed of his error. Arbitration
in standardized contracts may be desirable to avoid legal logic for the determination of business facts, but it can never achieve standardization of
result. The merchants' courts of the Middle Ages, which were absorbed
by the law because public policy dictated that there be but one system of
jurisprudence, at least had but one set of rules of law for the decisions of
their cases. Arbitrators have a myriad of them, uncontrolled as they are
in their decisions of law. The English say: "There must be no Alsatia in
England where the King's writ does not run".T But in the United States
each arbitration board may sit in an Alsatia all its own and decide as it will.
Yet who can complain when business men turn in desperation to private
tribunals because of the antiquated method of fact determination used by the
courts? What seller of skewers would desire an unintelligent jury to pass on
their quality, where probably none of the jury ever heard the word "skewer"
before the facts of the case were presented?
VIII. Conclusion and Herein of Proposed Solution of Business Sessions
It is not enough for the law to permit business arbitrators to find facts
as they deem "business logic" dictates, nor is any permanent solution evolved
by teaching and allowing business men to build up a proper arbitration procedure by contract. The law should provide business men with courts which
can determine business fact. It is proposed that a special "business session" be provided in our larger cities, at least, where the "trial" can be conducted along business lines. The parties can be at liberty to select their own
judges of the facts from business experts. Where they are unable to agree
on these expert "fact triers" the court or "Registrar of Business Judges"
should be able to appoint them from selected panels of experts in the particular field of dispute. These experts could determine the "business facts"
in a "business manner" with very limited court control and without court
supervision. The facts as found would be the subject of legal application
of legal rules by the court-which could adopt reforms in law heretofore
mCzarnikov v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., supra note 68, at 488.
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prevented by stare decisis. While the courts might be reluctant to break
away from anachronisms when dealing with juries, they would have a
good excuse to adopt new rules of law to apply to business facts in cases
where the rules of law do not work justice in modern business. The business man could still eat his cake, and the lawyers could have it too.88 The
former would have his facts and "business logic" as a basis of determination
of "business truth"; the latter the standardization and similar application
of law to equivalent circumstances.
This business session would be open only to those who agreed thereto,
and only to true commercial cases. It could be made as speedy and private
as business men demanded. Those who still preferred a trial by "jury of
their peers" would be able to obtain it. But it is submitted a "business session" would take much litigation away from the crowded jury sessions and
cases demanding a business solution would be properly solved.
If "business judges" in finding facts were held to the same rules as
referees little would be gained; but they should not be. True, there need
be many safeguards built up, and new special rules of evidence developed.
Berizzi v. Krausz would not apply. Business judges would still use their
own knowledge of situations. Little restriction would be placed on hearsay evidence. Public policy rules would be kept. The evidence problem
should be the subject of research and careful analysis, and business philosophers as well as legal technicians should be consulted in the progress.
There can be no doubt that many of our legal tools are insufficient and
ineffective. There can be no question that business is dissatisfied with them
in many ways, and among them is the trial as now provided. Business
men left alone decide their disputes by business logic in ascertainment of
business facts. Let the law adopt the business methodology for the determination of business disputes, and supplement it by rules of law in regularly constituted courts-a thing the business man cannot and will not do
alone or in arbitrations. Each can thus learn the other's language and come
to speak it.
'Of course where there is not even legal frosting on the cake the business man need
save none for the legal profession. Thus in a dispute which is purely factual, or where the
parties and arbitrators all agree on the legal solution once the facts are found, there is no
reason for arbitration to be displaced, no reason for courts or lawyers to interfere. It is
really in this sphere that arbitration has its place, a solution for a determination of pure
business fact, uncomplicated by law. When it' attempts to deal with law it is a stop-gap, and
an eventual failure. See Nordon, Arbitration (1926) 162 L. T. 262, and the Reports of the
Meeting of Solicitors' Managing Clerks Association (1931) 172 L. T. 455.

